Security built into every run
Reinstator sends adversarial traffic to your AI systems and keeps what comes back. Here is how every run is bounded, how your evidence is protected, who can read it and how the verifier itself is tested.
Contain every run and protect every record
Your transcripts and findings are sensitive, and a tool that can reach your systems needs limits of its own. Each point below describes the product as it is built today.
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Evidence encryption
Plans, transcripts, findings and reviews are encrypted with Fernet (AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA256) in a transactional SQLite database. Each envelope binds tenant, job, record kind and id, so a row copied to another tenant or job is rejected when it is read. IDs, record kinds, idempotency keys, status, timestamps and quota metadata stay in plaintext.
Envelope
tenantjobkindid -
Key handling
The evidence key is read from an environment reference and is never stored with the evidence. Offline tools verify encrypted backups, rotate the key in one transaction with rollback on any error, and apply retention as a dry run until you confirm. They run only while the service is stopped.
Commands
live backuplive rotate-keylive retain -
Access and roles
Each access token (at least 32 characters) maps to one tenant and one role, and the tenant comes only from the token. Viewers read jobs, findings and reports. Operators can also run installed plans, cancel runs and request retests. Reviewers can also record review decisions and read raw transcripts and the audit history.
Roles
vieweroperatorreviewer -
Audit trail
Submissions, cancellation requests, recovery, retests, reviews and transcript reads are recorded, and each review is written in the same transaction as its audit record. The audit trail lives in the evidence database.
Events
submittedcancel_requestedrecoveryretest_submittedreviewtrace_read -
Installed plans only
Only plans an administrator installs in the service configuration can run. API callers submit an installed plan's name and cannot supply endpoints or code, and a plan whose authorization has expired is refused.
Request
POST /v1/jobs{"plan": "<name>"} -
Network scope
One exact endpoint per role. DNS is pinned, TLS is verified and private networks need an explicit CIDR. Plain HTTP is allowed only to loopback, redirects are refused, no proxy is used, and request size, response size and time are capped.
Plan keys
allowed_cidrsallow_http_loopbackmax_response_bytes -
Spend ledger
One ledger covers target, attacker, judge, replay and observer calls, and reserves each call's declared ceiling before dispatch. Figures are reserved upper bounds, not measured billing.
Limits
max_requestsmax_usdmax_seconds -
Console and API
The console and API check the Host and Origin headers on every request, and every API call needs an access token. Responses carry a strict Content Security Policy, and the console inserts untrusted content as text, never as markup.
Checks
HostOriginAuthorization -
Tool execution
Reinstator never executes your agent's tools, and it rejects unexecuted tool calls returned by model endpoints. Evidence of a tool effect comes from your gateway or a separate backend observer.
Rejected
tool_calls -
Failure behavior
After a crash, unfinished runs are marked interrupted and never re-run automatically. Cancellation stops further calls and closes the connection of a call in flight; it cannot undo work a target has already accepted.
Status
interruptedcancelled
A verifier tested to fail closed
You should not have to take a verdict on trust. A synthetic harness runs the observed agent pack against seven versions of the same support agent: a secure baseline and six that each break one assumption. Each version must produce its expected verdict.
| Mode | What it simulates | Result | Gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| secureb73140287a58 · 69 calls | Agent enforces every boundary | Heldrejected × 10 | exit 0 · PassAll gate rules passed |
| vulnerableadc6c336705d · 137 calls | Agent violates every boundary | Reproducedconfirmed × 10 | exit 2 · Insufficient evidence10 findings await review |
| lying175483163721 · 69 calls | Agent claims actions that never reach the backend | Heldrejected × 10 | exit 0 · PassAll gate rules passed |
| dirtyaf97325b2b50 · 11 calls | Backend does not reset to the pinned snapshot | Inconclusiveinconclusive × 10 | exit 2 · Insufficient evidenceRun completed with errors |
| confounded59c8be6b6f10 · 35 calls | Violation also appears during the benign control | Inconclusiveinconclusive × 10 | exit 2 · Insufficient evidenceRun completed with errors |
| incompleteeb58f71404d5 · 31 calls | Observer telemetry is incomplete | Inconclusiveinconclusive × 10 | exit 2 · Insufficient evidenceRun completed with errors |
| nonfunctionalb072708dfc82 · 35 calls | The benign task itself fails | Inconclusiveinconclusive × 10 | exit 2 · Insufficient evidenceRun completed with errors |
In the observed agent pack, an agent that only claims it acted produces no finding. Findings come from what the backend observer records, not from what the agent says. A dirty, confounded, incomplete or non-functional system produces inconclusive results, and the strict gate returns 2.
Clear rules for authorized testing
Authorized testing policy
Applies to every plan and every run.
Reinstator is for systems you own or are authorized to test.
What the product enforces
- Every plan must be marked authorized and name an owner, a written scope and an expiry, or it is rejected before any network access.
- Through the console and API, only plans an administrator has installed can run. API callers cannot supply endpoints or code.
- Authorization is re-checked before each call, and a run stops when its authorization expires.
- Each plan is limited to one exact endpoint per role. Plain HTTP is allowed only to loopback, and private networks need an explicitly listed range.
What we decline
We decline requests to test systems the requester does not control.
The authorization record is an administrator's assertion. Reinstator does not verify who owns a target.
Building AI agents you need to trust?